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I.

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

Legal Voice is a regional non-profit public interest organization
that works to advance the legal rights of all women in the Pacific
Northwest through litigation, legislative advocacy, and legal rights
education. Since its founding in 1978 (as the Northwest Women’s Law
Center), Legal Voice has been at the forefront of efforts to combat sex
discrimination. Legal Voice has participated as counsel and as amicus
curiae in cases throughout the Northwest and the country involving gender
discrimination, including sexual harassment and sex discrimination in the
workplace, educational settings, and in public accommodations, including
serving as counsel in one of the few Washington Supreme Court cases
involving a claim of sex discrimination in a place of public
accommodation, Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v.
Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wn.2d 224, 59 P.3d 655
(2002). Legal Voice serves as a regional expert advocating for legislation
and for robust interpretation and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws
to protect women and gender-nonconforming people. Legal Voice has a
strong interest in ensuring that the Washington

Law Against

Discrimination is interpreted to protect against sexual, gender-based, and
other forms of harassment, including in public accommodations.
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality
(“Korematsu Center”) is a nonprofit organization based at Seattle

1

University School of Law and works to advance justice through research,
advocacy, and education. The Korematsu Center is dedicated to advancing
the legacy of Fred Korematsu who defied military orders during World
War II that led to the internment of 110,000 Japanese Americans, and later
became an advocate for civil rights of others who are victims of
discrimination. The Korematsu Center has a strong interest in ensuring
that effective remedies exist to address discrimination. The Korematsu
Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, represent the official views of
Seattle University.
II.

INTRODUCTION

Though the immediate lawsuit seeks to vindicate Appellant
Floeting’s rights, much more is at stake here. This case – one of first
impression under a provision of the Washington’s Law Against
Discrimination (“WLAD”) that is rarely litigated – calls upon the Court to
define what constitutes harassment (sex-based or otherwise) in a place of
public accommodation and who is liable for it. If the Court adopts
Respondent Group Health’s view of the law, the entities that open their
doors to the public will be liable for unfair practices in only the most
limited circumstances, leaving deprivation of civil rights in our hospitals,
civic spaces, restaurants, and hotels unmitigated. The Court should reject
this invitation and instead adopt a rule of liability that is appropriate to the
public accommodation context, consistent with the plain language of the
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WLAD, and faithful to the highest policy objectives of the Act. On the
facts of this case, such a rule of law would leave the determination of
whether Mr. Floeting was deprived of his civil rights in the capable hands
of the jury.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Amici Curiae adopt the Appellant’s Statement of the Case.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The WLAD Is Construed Liberally to Effectuate the Purpose
of the Act.
Washington State has a long and proud tradition of being on the

forefront of promoting civil rights. In 1949, the legislature enacted antidiscrimination laws targeting the workplace; 1 in 1957, it added further
protections in places of public accommodations and publicly-assisted
housing; 2 and in 1973, it passed anti-discrimination laws protecting
persons with disabilities. 3 All of these enactments preceded similar
provisions under the federal 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1968 Fair Housing
Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, respectively. What
is more, Washington’s Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) has a
broader reach than analogous federal laws; for example, it protects
women, breastfeeding mothers, and gays and lesbians from discrimination

1

Laws of 1949, ch. 183, § 1.
Laws of 1957, ch. 37, §2.
3
Laws of 1973, ch. 141 (adding sex, marital status and age); Laws of 1973, ch, 214
(adding disability); Laws of 2009, ch. 164 (adding breastfeeding).
2

3

in places of public accommodation.4 RCW 49.60.040; see also WAC 16232-040

(describing

prohibited

harassment

based

on

gender

identity/expression in place of public accommodation).
The purpose of the WLAD is, simply stated, to deter and eradicate
discrimination

in

Washington.

RCW

49.60.010

(declaring

that

“discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its
inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic state.”). The law “embodies a public policy of the highest
priority.” Xieng v. Peoples Nat. Bank of Washington, 120 Wn.2d 512, 521,
844 P.2d 389 (1993) (internal citation and quotation omitted). In contrast
to federal anti-discrimination legislation, our state statute includes express
and emphatic language, directing the courts to construe the Act liberally to
effectuate its purpose. RCW 49.60.020; see also Fraternal Order of
Eagles v. Tenino Aerie No. 564, 148 Wn.2d 224, 247, 59 P.3d 655 (2002)
(noting the statute should be liberally construed).
In the public accommodations context, the right to be free from
discrimination includes the right to “full enjoyment” of those services and
privileges. RCW 49.60.030. Denial or deprivation of such a right is an
affront to personal dignity. See Anderson v. Pantages Theater Co., 114
Wash. 24, 31, 194 P. 813 (1921) (“The act [of discrimination] alleged in
itself carries with it the elements of an assault upon the person, and in such
4

Laws of 2006, ch. 4 (adding sexual orientation).

4

cases the personal indignity inflicted, the feeling of humiliation and
disgrace engendered, and the consequent mental suffering, are elements of
actual damages.”); accord Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 250, 85 S. Ct. 348, 13 L. Ed. 2d 258 (1964) (the
“fundamental object” of laws banning discrimination in public
accommodations is “to vindicate the deprivation of personal dignity that
surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.”)
(internal citation and quotations omitted). Said another way, public
accommodation laws serve to “eliminate the unfairness, humiliation, and
insult of … discrimination in facilities which purport to serve the general
public.” Rousseve v. Shape Spa for Health & Beauty, Inc., 516 F.2d 64, 67
(5th Cir. 1975).
B.

Harassment Is a Form of Discrimination in a Place of Public
Accommodation.
There can be no serious dispute that discrimination in a place of

public accommodation includes conduct that falls short of an outright
denial of service, such as humiliation, harassment, or insult. See RCW
49.60.040(14) (definition of “full enjoyment” includes the right to access
“facilities” and “privileges” without being treated as “not welcome,
accepted, desired, or solicited.”). Contrary to Group Health’s urging, any
fair reading of the definition of “full enjoyment” in concert with the public
accommodations provision (RCW 49.60.215, or “section 215”) compels

5

such a conclusion. One Washington court has already recognized as much.
See Evergreen Sch. Dist. No. 114 v. Washington State Human Rights
Comm'n, on Behalf of Johnson, 39 Wn. App. 763, 775, 695 P.2d 999
(1985) (accepting the proposition that “a denial [of full and equal services]
occurs when there is discriminatory or abusive treatment” and not just
outright refusals of entry) (citing King v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 656 P.2d
349, 351 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)).
To conclude otherwise would mean that a barista could make
disparaging and insulting comments toward a mother about her choice to
breastfeed at a coffee shop and suggest she go to the toilet to do so, and no
liability would attach so long as the salesperson does not refuse to take her
order. Or it would permit a sales clerk to tease and humiliate a customer
about her disability, and again, no liability would attach so long as the
customer was not prevented from completing her transaction. Such a rule
would ignore the chief harm resulting from discrimination that the WLAD
was designed to guard against in the first place: the injury to an
individual’s self-worth and integrity. See Anderson, 114 Wash. at 31;
accord King, 656 P.2d at 352. The liberal construction of the WLAD does
not so permit.
Indeed, for this very reason, Washington courts have longrecognized harassment as a form of unlawful discrimination in the
employment context, which of course does not take the form of outright

6

exclusion from the workplace, such as a termination or failure-to-hire. See,
e.g., Glasgow v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 103 Wn.2d 401, 406, 693 P.2d 708
(1985) (recognizing hostile work environment as form of sex
discrimination under WLAD); Davis v. W. One Auto. Group, 140 Wn.
App. 449, 457, 166 P.3d 807 (2007) (recognizing claim of racially hostile
work environment); Fisher v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 53 Wn. App. 591,
769 P.2d 318 (1989) (same); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 4344, 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (recognizing claim of disability-based hostile work
environment); accord Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66,
106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986) (recognizing claim of sex-based
hostile work environment under Title VII). Likewise, harassment is
uniformly recognized as a form of discrimination under laws prohibiting
discrimination in education,5 housing,6 and health care.7
5

Title IX has been interpreted to protect every student (and other individuals protected
by Title IX) from sex-based harassment that limits their ability to participate in or benefit
from the education program, or that creates a hostile or abusive educational environment.
See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Guidance (1997),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/sexhar01.html.
6
24 C.F.R. § 100. This rule was the specific subject of recent rulemaking. See U.S.
Housing & Urban Development Department, Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment
Harassment and Liability for Discriminatory Housing Practices Under the Fair Housing
Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 63054 (Sept. 14, 2016).
7
While the Department of Health and Human Services declined to include a separate
harassment provision, it did unequivocally recognize that harassment was a form of
discrimination: “OCR recognizes that various forms of harassment can impede an
individual's ability to participate in or benefit from a health program or activity and can
thus constitute unlawful discrimination under Section 1557 and this part. … Consistent
with the well-established interpretation of existing civil rights laws, OCR interprets the
final rule to prohibit all forms of unlawful harassment based on a protected
characteristic.” U.S. Health & Human Servs. Dep’t, Nondiscrimination in Health
Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31376, 31405-06 (May 18, 2016) (internal
citations omitted).
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C.

The Court Should Adopt a Rule of Liability for Proving
Harassment in a Place of Accommodation That Is Consistent
with WLAD’s Purpose to Eradicate Discrimination.
This case presents an issue of first impression under Washington

law: What must the plaintiff show to establish unlawful harassment in a
place of public accommodation?
1.

The Definition of Harassment.

Group Health urges the Court to blindly apply all elements of an
employment discrimination claim (section 180 of RCW 49.60) for
purposes of determining whether an entity is liable for an unfair practice in
a place of public accommodation (section 215). Yet, the public policies
underlying the two are distinct and, arguably, the protections are much
broader under the latter provision. Section 215 declares it an unfair
practice to commit an act that results “directly or indirectly” in (1) “any
distinction, restriction, or discrimination” in a place of public
accommodation, or (2) requires any person to pay more than the uniform
rates charged other persons, or (3) “refus[e] or withhold[]” admission from
any person. RCW 49.60.215 (emphasis added). The employment provision
has different aims altogether: it declares it an unfair practice for an
employer to (1) “refuse to hire any person” because of her protected
status, (2) “discharge or bar” a person from employment because of her
protected status, (3) to discriminate in compensation or in any terms or
conditions of employment, or (4) to, inter alia, discriminate in advertising
for a position. RCW 49.60.180.

8

Engaging in conduct that results in “any” “distinction, restriction,
or discrimination” in the “full enjoyment” of public accommodation
services is simply not the same conduct that courts (and juries) have
deemed sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of employment (e.g.,
severe or pervasive harassment). This is not to say that the decades-long
effort of defining and refining what constitutes “harassment” in the
workplace is meaningless. To the contrary, the pattern jury instruction for
outlining a plaintiff’s burden of proof in the employment setting provides
a useful starting point for the instant case. But reflect the statutory text of
section 215 and the concept of “full enjoyment.” Amici suggest the
following:
To establish [his] [her] claim of harassment on the basis of
[protected status], plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the
following propositions:
(1) That there was language or conduct [of a sexual nature, or
racial nature, as appropriate];
(2) That this language or conduct was unwelcome in the sense that
Plaintiff regarded the conduct as undesirable and offensive, and did
not solicit or incite it;
(3) That this conduct or language was so offensive or pervasive
that it altered the conditions of (name of plaintiff's) employment
directly or indirectly altered the plaintiff’s full enjoyment of a
place of public accommodation; and
(4) That the language or conduct was carried out by the defendant
[or the defendant’s agent or employee, as appropriate].

9

See 6A Wash. Prac., Wash. Pattern Jury Instr. Civ. WPI 330.23 (6th ed.)
(strike-throughs and modifications added). 8

This articulation of the

plaintiff’s burden balances a subjective test of what constitutes offensive
language or conduct (element 2) with how a reasonable person would
view such language or conduct (element 3) and requires, simply enough,
that the plaintiff show a causal connection between the misconduct and the
alleged deprivation or alteration of services. This rule of liability would
not render Group Health or other entities liable for “casual, isolated, or
trivial” remarks because the conduct or language must be offensive
enough to directly or indirectly alter the plaintiff’s full enjoyment in a
place of public accommodation.
2.

The Scope of Liability for Acts of Employees

The fourth and last element suggested above identifies who can be
held liable for the harassing conduct. Borrowing from the employment
context, Group Health spends considerable time on a mashup of state and
federal common law agency-related concepts, urging the Court to adopt a
negligence standard for imputing liability to entities for the acts of their

8

This burden of proof recognizes that requiring a victim of harassment to identify a
comparator makes little sense. By contrast, where there is an allegation of disparate
treatment in a place of public accommodation, a plaintiff may seek to prove her case
through such evidence. See Demelash v. Ross Stores, Inc., 105 Wn. App. 508, 525, 20
P.3d 447 (2001) (setting out elements of a claim of disparate treatment in public
accommodations).
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non-supervisory employees. Br. at 33-36. This argument ignores the plain
language of the statute, which this Court cannot do.9
The public accommodations provision of the WLAD imputes
liability to entities (persons) for the acts of employees:
It shall be an unfair practice for any person or the person’s
agent or employee to commit an act which directly or
indirectly results in any distinction, restriction, or
discrimination….[in a place of public accommodation].
RCW 49.60.215 (emphasis added). The provision is plain on its face: any
“person” is liable for the unfair acts of his or her (or its) “employee”
separate and apart from when those employees are acting as agents for the
entity.10 Indeed, the legislature calls out the concept of agency separately,
in the disjunctive, by using the term “agent” separate and apart from
“employee.” Id. No other construction of the statute is required; Group
Health is liable for T.T.’s misconduct because, simply enough, T.T. is
Group Health’s employee.
There are fourteen different “unfair practices” provisions under the
WLAD, and the legislature chose just two instances in which the acts of
employees would be automatically imputed to the entity: (1) the public

9

The starting point for determining legislative intent is the language of the statute. See
Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002); State
v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). If the language is plain on its face, as
here, the Court goes no further. State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d 212, 217, 883 P.2d 320
(1994) (“Plain language does not require construction.”).
10

There is no dispute that Group Health is a “person,” subject to the WLAD, as it is
broadly defined to include, inter alia, “any owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, agent, or
employee….” RCW 49.60.040(19). Likewise, there is no dispute that Group Health,
because it provides medical services, qualifies as a place of public accommodation.
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accommodations provision (section 215), quoted above, and (2) the
provision that follows it, concerning discrimination against persons with
disabilities who use service animals in eating establishments (section 218).
Both use the identical imputed-liability phrase (“a person or a person’s
agent or employee”), in stark contrast to the other dozen provisions. See,
e.g., RCW 49.60.176 (making “any person” liable for unfair practices in
connection with credit transactions); .178 (same as to insurance
transactions); 180 (making any “employer” liable for employment
discrimination);.222 (making “any person” liable in connection to real
estate transactions);.190 (making any “labor union or labor organization”
liable for discrimination in union membership); .200 (making any
“employment agency” liable for discrimination); 223 (making any
“person” liable as to rental or sale of property in a given neighborhood).
We must presume this addition of imputed liability – in just two of
a dozen provisions – was intentional and not by accident. Cf. In re Det. of
Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476, 491, 55 P.3d 597 (2002) (presuming that the
use of language in one provision of a statute that differs from another was
intentional, applying “expressio unius” canon of statutory construction);
accord Keenfe Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208, 113 S. Ct. 2035,
124 L. Ed. 2d 118 (1993) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983)) (reasoning that where
legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but

12

omits it in another, it is presumed that the legislature acts “intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).
Group Health not does explain why this Court should look to
agency liability principles developed in one of the fourteen “unfair
practices” provisions (section 180) in order to construe WLAD’s public
accommodation provision (section 215). The logic of adopting common
law agency principles in defining the scope of employer liability for
workplace discrimination is beyond the scope of what is presented here;
suffice it to say that it is not an altogether clear path, albeit one that is
well-worn. See Glasgow, 103 Wn.2d at 407 n.2 (citing federal appellate
decisions construing Title VII as instructive for determining the elements
of a sexual harassment claim in the employment context).11 And, in the
employment context, the adoption of various agency principles is not
without its critics and problems – namely, inconsistencies from one
statutory framework to the next. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin
Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under
Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 755, 757

11

That is, no Washington court has articulated why the WLAD’s scope of employer
liability should be coterminous with that under Title VII when the text of the two statutes
differs in many respects. Compare RCW 49.60.040(11) (definition of “employer”
includes “any person…who employs….”) with 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (“Title VII”)
(definition of “employer” includes “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
… and any agent of such a person…”); and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 754-55, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998) (reasoning that Congress
intended the courts to interpret Title VII based on agency principles in light of the fact
that “employer” is defined under Title VII to include “agents.”).
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(1999) (discussing the “puzzle of the inconsistency” for imputing liability
and advocating for a simple vicarious liability rule across all civil rights
statutes).12
The salient fact is that our legislature chose to do something
different with respect to treatment members of the public, such as
consumers, in places of public accommodation and with respect to those
with service animals. Undoubtedly, this is the province of the legislature –
to establish standards of conduct and attendant rules of liability in pursuit
of public policy and the greater good. See, e.g., Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wn.
App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978) (recognizing liability of tavern owner for
harm caused by intoxicated minor, reasoning that the legislature
proscribed certain conduct, thus establishing a duty different from that at
common law); accord United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73, 95 S.
Ct. 1903, 44 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1975) (recognizing congressional intent to
impose higher standard of care on food sellers, imposing criminal liability
even where no awareness of wrongdoing, incentivizing those in position to
act to prevent hazards). In drafting section 215 to impute liability to the
employer for the employee’s unfair practices, the legislature has
incentivized companies to take proactive steps to train and supervise their

12

To add to the confusion, courts acknowledge that “common-law principles may not be
transferable in all their particulars to Title VII.” Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 755
(quoting Meritor Savings, 477 U.S. at 72). But when, why, and how they apply is not
always clear; the Court should tread carefully in looking to employment cases as
persuasive authority.

14

rank and file employees – (i.e., the people who actually interact with the
customers) – to ensure compliance with the law. Cf. United Park, 421 U.S.
at 672-73.
A plain language reading of section 215 to allow for vicarious
liability also makes sense as applied to real world conditions. Unlike
dealings in the workplace, most consumer interactions are fleeting. Take,
for example, a lifeguard who levels anti-immigrant, islamophobic insults
toward a Somali man and his hijab-wearing daughter. The most likely
outcome is that the father will simply take his daughter elsewhere, leaving
the lifeguard to repeat her offenses on the next Muslim family. In the very
unlikely event the father summons the courage to complain, the very most
he will get, according to Group Health, is an apology. Under Group
Health’s view, the pool owner is never liable for the unquestionably unfair
practice of its lifeguard unless she also happens to be the pool manager
(i.e., the owner’s “agent”) or unless upper-management had notice of
prior, similar incidents and failed to take action. Absent one of these two
conditions, Group Health argues, no liability attaches to the owner no
matter how offensive, degrading, or harmful the lifeguard’s conduct. Not
only does this argument run afoul of the plain language of the imputedliability provision in the statute, it has the perverse effect of creating a “no
liability” rule in the vast majority of cases: consumer encounters will
almost always be with rank-and-file employees – clerks, salespeople,
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receptionists, servers – and not managers. Cf. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc.,
207 F.3d 803, 810 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting strict adherence to agency
principles in public accommodation context because “a rule that only
actions by supervisors are imputed to the employer would result, in most
cases, in a no liability rule.”). And it does very little if anything to
incentivize owners and operators to train and supervise their staff to avoid
harassment.13
Moreover, the Court should view any argument that adopting
Amici’s proposed standard of liability will open the floodgates to lawsuits
with a heavy dose of skepticism. The public accommodation provision of
the WLAD has existed for over a half-century; and laws protecting against
race discrimination in public accommodations go back twice as far. See
Anderson, 114 Wash. 24. Yet, the dearth of reported cases (and indeed, the
fact that this case presents one of first impression) reveals a very serious
problem of under-enforcement. That is: there is no reason to believe that
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, and the like is
any less prevalent in our theaters, pools, and coffee shops than it is in our
workplaces, but while the latter has led to a vast body of decisional
authority, there are by comparison almost no cases vindicating civil rights
in places of public accommodations. The reality is, this form of
13

The concern in Arguello for avoiding perverse results is equally warranted here, but
this Court is not so constrained by the common law backdrop as the Fifth Circuit was in
construing claims under federal civil rights statutes (section 1981 and 1983) which
include no such statutory-imputed liability as here.
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discrimination, however unconscionable, does not typically bring with it
significant monetary damages. Few people will be inclined to endure the
stress of litigation for what amounts to a moral victory (particularly by the
time the costs of suit are paid). And plaintiffs’ attorneys, more often than
not paid on contingency, are unlikely to be willing to take on the risk of
litigating such claims when the potential for recovery is effectively limited
to fees.
In sum, the Court should adopt a standard of liability that tracks
the text of the statute, is faithful to Act’s purpose of eradicating
discrimination and promoting full enjoyment in places of public
accommodation, and one that reflects the reality of consumer-type
transactions.
D.

Discrimination, Including Harassment, Poses Barriers to
Accessing Health Care, with Resulting Negative Impacts on
Public Health.
Finally, Amici respectfully request the Court to consider the

specific context of this case: Rev. Floeting was seeking health care
services. In the health care context, harassment not only can itself create
negative health impacts, but it also can result in denial and/or impairment
of access to care in important and harmful ways.
Critically, sexual or other forms of harassment in health care can
discourage people from seeking care.14 For example, a provider who uses
14

When patients do not feel comfortable as a result of harassment or because of a
provider’s perceived implicit or explicit bias, they are less likely to get comprehensive
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derogatory language when talking to a woman who is unmarried and
sexually active or pregnant may create a hostile environment that could
keep her from accessing needed reproductive health care.15
Discrimination in health care settings can be particularly
pronounced when individuals identify with more than one protected class.
For example, African American women generally receive lower quality
medical services than White women, with disparities in early diagnosis of
breast cancer and maternal death rates worsening in recent years. 16 In
addition, the percentage of women reporting that their provider did not
listen, explain things clearly, respect what they had to say, or spend
enough time with them was higher among Black women than White
women.17
medical care. See, e.g., Irene Blair et al., Clinicians’ Implicit Ethnic/Racial Bias and
Perceptions of Care Among Black and Latino Patients, 11 Annals of Family Med. 43, 43
(2013) (finding that “clinicians’ implicit bias may jeopardize their clinical relationships
with black patients, which could have negative effects on other care processes”); Valerie
Ulene, Doctors and Nurses’ Weight Biases Harm Overweight Patients, L.A. Times
(Dec. 13, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/13/health/la-he-the-md-weight-bias20101213 (discussing negative health implications of stigma and bias by providers
against obese and overweight patients).
15
Texas Policy Evaluation Project, Barriers to Family Planning Access in Texas 1 (May
2015), http://www.utexas.edu/cola/txpep/_files/pdf/TxPEP-ResearchBrief_Barriers-toFamily-Planning-Access-inTexas_May2015.pdf (showing that 30% of respondents
reported “Don’t feel comfortable with healthcare providers” as a barrier to accessing
reproductive health care.).
16
Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
AHRQ Pub. No. 13-0003, National Healthcare Disparities Report 2012 10-5 (2013),
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhdr12/nhdr12_prov.pdf.
17
Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
AHRQ Pub. No. 12-0006-3-EF, Disparities in Healthcare Quality Among Minority
Women: Findings from the 2011 National Healthcare Quality and Disparities Reports 6
(2012), available at https://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/nhqrdr11/minoritywomen.pdf.
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Along with African American and undocumented individuals,
many transgender and gender non-conforming individuals also report
being verbally, and sometimes physically, harassed in medical settings.18
A 2010 study found that 70 percent of transgender respondents and nearly
56 percent of lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents reported experiencing
at least one instance of discrimination or patient profiling when attempting
to access health services.19 Further, 28 percent of transgender and gender
nonconforming individuals report facing harassment in medical settings,
and 19 percent report being refused medical care altogether due to their
transgender status.” 20 The negative impacts of such discrimination are
striking: 48 percent of transgender and gender non-conforming individuals
report postponing seeking care when sick or injured and 50 percent report
postponing or avoiding preventive care.” 21

18

Jaime M. Grant et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal. & Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task
Force, National Transgender Discrimination Survey Report on Health & Health Care 5-6
(Oct. 2010), available at http://transequality.org/PDFs/NTDSReportonHealth_final.pdf.
See also Nat’l Ctr. for Transgender Equal., Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey,
available at http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-ReportFINAL.PDF (reporting survey results showing that in the past year, 23% of respondents
did not see a doctor when they needed to because of fear of being mistreated as a
transgender person).
19
Lambda Legal, When Health Care Isn’t Caring: Lambda Legal’s Survey of
Discrimination Against LGBT People and People with HIV 5 (2010), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/whcicreport_when-health-care-isnt-caring.pdf
20
See Jaime M. Grant et al., Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force & Nat’l Ctr. for
Transgender Equal., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National Transgender
Discrimination
Survey
72
(2011),
available
at
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf.
21
Id. at 76.
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Patients often do not have much choice in providers or health
systems. Indeed, most health insurance covers care for its insured that is
limited to a network of providers. Thus, they are in effect a captive
audience for services that can literally have life or death consequences.
Because of the potentially low monetary damages involved – one
may be tempted to diminish the significance of discriminatory conduct in
places of public accommodation.

As this discussion about access to

health care reveals, discrimination in the provision of services has
implications beyond dignitary harm. Indeed, Floeting could not simply
“shop” elsewhere for the services he needed, nor should the law require
him to.
V.

CONCLUSION

Our legislature recognized long ago that the evil of discrimination
“menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.”
RCW 49.60.010. The Court has the opportunity to announce a standard of
liability for what constitutes harassment in a place of accommodation and
who is liable for such misconduct. In doing so, Amici urge the Court adopt
a standard of liability that draws from the definition of workplace
harassment where appropriate, but avoids the miasma of that body of law
where it is not. To do otherwise frustrates the purpose of the Act to
promote full participation in public life and in the marketplace, regardless
of a person’s gender, the color of her skin, the place of her birth, the god
she worships, the service animal by her side.
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